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The paper represents a contribution to the ongoing discussion on regulating social
media platforms (SMP) and especially Facebook, mostly fueled by a recent series
of scandals  such  as Cambridge  Analytica,  which  highlighted  the recognized
problem  of Facebook’s  lack  of accountability.  In response  to the scandal,  which
coincided  with  long-expected  wide-scale  implementation  of the EU’s  GDPR,
Facebook  introduced  a series  of measures  on its  platform,  such  as improved
traceability of advertisers, or greater power over one’s own data. Besides, Facebook
was  put  under  scrutiny  of competition  law  authorities,  mainly  the German
Bundeskartellamt.  Taking  into  consideration  all  the regulatory  approaches,
the question  remains  whether  sufficiently  effective  design  for  holding the SMPs
accountable  has  been  established  or not.  In the paper,  we  first  outline
the accountability  issues  SMPs  currently  face,  namely  the data  handling  and
privacy issue, the platforms’ impact on political processes, or related monopolistic
positioning.  We  ascertain  that  common  denominator  of these  issues  is
the platforms’  design,  which  is  created  to achieve  business  objectives,  while
imposing substantial  negative  externalities  on the society.  Alongside,  we  review
the platforms’ reactions, i.e. the self-regulatory measures adopted by the platforms
in 2017–2018. We also specifically focus on the evaluation of the competition law
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as one instrument of regulating certain aspects of the platforms, especially in light
of the recent German Bundeskartellamt decision on Facebook. We claim that most
of the measures  and  current  instruments,  although  improving  the lack
of accountability,  fall  short  of addressing  the core  issue  of Facebook’s  status –
absence of scrutiny over the platform’s design.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Facebook and other social media platforms (SMP) ventured far from being
generally  understood  as actors  for  the common  good.1 There  were
numerous  cases  of abuses  of the platforms,  by third  parties  or platforms
themselves,  accidental  or deliberate.  Notorious  influencing  of elections
in USA,  or France,  based  on fake  profiles  and  bots,  creation  and
amplification  of fake  content,  led  to massive  investigation  and  political
uproar.2 Such  events  are  a reason  for  great  concern,  particularly
to established  democracies  as they  appear  to be  more  susceptible  to fake
news  techniques.3 The mishandling  of users’  data  by Facebook,  especially
in relation to third parties such as Cambridge Analytica, is alarming.4 SMPs
also  became  means  of promotion  of religious  and  racial  hatred  against
1 Tufekci,  Z. (2018)  How social media took us from Tahrir Square to Donald Trump. MIT
Technology  Review.  [online] Available  from:  http://www.technologyreview.com/s/611806/
how-social-media-took-us-from-tahrir-square-to-donald-trump/ [Accessed 15 March 2019].
2 Guess, A., Nagler, J. and Tucker, J. (2019) Less than you think: Prevalence and predictors
of fake news dissemination on Facebook. Science Advances, 5 (1). [online] doi: 10.1126/sciadv.
aau4586  [Accessed  15  March  2019];  Ferrara,  E.  (2017)  Disinformation  and  social  bot
operations  in the run  up  to the 2017  French  presidential  election.  First  Monday, 22 (8).
[online] doi: 10.5210/fm.v22i8.8005 [Accessed 15 March 2019]; Allcott, H. and Gentzkow, M.
(2017)  Social  Media and Fake  News in the 2016 Election.  Journal  of Economic  Perspectives,
31 (2), pp. 211–236.  [online]  doi: 10.1257/jep.31.2.211 [Accessed 15 March 2019]; Hansen, I.
and Lim, D. J. (2018) Doxing democracy: influencing elections via cyber voter interference.
Contemporary  Politics, 25 (2),  pp. 150–171.  [online]  doi:  10.1080/13569775.2018.1493629
[Accessed 15 March 2019]; see the US Senate Judiciary Committee’s report in Senate Judiciary
Committee.  (2017)  Extremist  content  and  Russian  disinformation  online:  Working  with  tech
to find  solutions.  [online] Available  from:  www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/extremist-
content-and-russian-disinformation-online-working-with-tech-to-find-solutions  [Accessed
15 March 2019].
3 Farrell,  H. J.  and Schneier,  B. (2018)  Common-Knowledge Attacks on Democracy. SSRN
Electronic Journal. [online] doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3273111 [Accessed 15 March 2019].
4 Isaak, J. and Hanna, M. J. (2018) User Data Privacy: Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and
Privacy  Protection.  Computer, 51 (8),  pp. 56–59.  [online] doi:  10.1109/mc.2018.3191268
[Accessed 15 March 2019]; Bartlett, J. (2018)  Big data is watching you – and it wants your
vote. The Spectator, 24 March. [online] Available from: https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/03/
big-data-is-watching-you-and-it-wants-your-vote/ [Accessed 15 March 2019].
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certain  communities  (e.g. the case  of Rohingya,  mob  murders  in India).5
To sum it up, the platforms have become political market places with wide
social implications, which necessarily leads to the question of accountability
of the platforms.6
The paper  focuses  on the issue  of accountability  while  it  examines
the regulatory  approaches  towards  the platforms.  In particular,  the paper
asks,  first,  what  are  the factors  suggesting  the lack  of accountability
of SMPs; second, whether SMPs may be efficiently regulated by currently
available  regulatory  mechanisms,  in particular  by competition  law  after
the Bundeskartellalmt  Facebook  decision;  and  third,  what  the underlying
problems of regulating SMPs are. 
In the first  part,  we  review  accountability  deficits,  selected  according
to their  gravity  and  representativeness  in the media,  and  reflect
on the current  regulatory  regimes.  We also  briefly  review  self-regulatory
measures  applied  by the platforms.  In the second  part  of the paper,  we
specifically  focus  on the recent  development  in the competition  law
in relation to SMPs. Finally, we discuss prospective regulatory measures. 
2. ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICITS OF SMPS
One  of the core  issues  of platforms  lies  in the legal  understanding
of platforms: what are SMPs from legal point of view? SMPs have long been
recognized  as internet  service  providers  (ISP),  who  are  generally  not
responsible for the content published on their services by the users.7 Unlike
ISPs, traditional media are responsible and liable for the published content,
as they are gatekeepers for third party content, and they produce content
on their  own. Understanding SMPs as traditional  media  requires  making
them responsible for the users’ content, which is not feasible and could be
arguably disproportionate as to the objectives of such measure.8 But while
SMPs do not produce content, their algorithms curate the content on behalf
5 Goel, V. et al. (2018) How WhatsApp Leads Mobs to Murder in India. The New York Times,
18 July. [online] Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/18/technology
/whatsapp-india-killings.html [Accessed 15 March 2019]; Müller, K. and Schwarz, C. (2017)
Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media and Hate Crime. SSRN Electronic Journal. [online]
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3082972 [Accessed 15 March 2019].
6 Ceron, A. (2018) Social Media and Political Accountability Bridging the Gap between Citizens and
Politicians. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 205.
7 Jeweler, M. G. (2008) The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 is Outdated and
Publisher Liability for Defamation Should be Reinstated Against Internet Service Providers.
Pittsburgh Journal of Technology Law and Policy, 8. [online] doi: 10.5195/tlp.2008.40 [Accessed
15 March 2019].
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of users, for instance in prioritization and personalization. Such curation is
not unlike curation in traditional media, although done automatically and
with high degree of personalization.9
Understanding  SMPs  as a form  of traditional  media  does  not  capture
the nature  of SMPs to their  full  extent.  From a socio-political  perspective,
SMPs  seem  to effectively  serve  as online  public  fora.  Some  recent  court
decisions underline the political nature and importance of such public fora
for  free  speech.  For  instance,  in recent  Knight  First  Amendment  Institute
v. Trump  (2018),  the court  held  that  the President’s  Twitter  account
effectively serves as a public forum and that
“the blocking  of the plaintiffs  based  on their  political  speech  constitutes
viewpoint discrimination that violates the First Amendment”.10
Commenting and disagreeing with online statuses and tweets constitutes
protected speech  with  protected access.11 A similar  decision  was reached
by the US  District  Court  in Virginia,  upheld  by the 4th US  Circuit  Court
of Appeals  in 2019, when the court held that a Facebook  page is deliberately
designed to be a “public forum”, which if used by the politicians, represents
a constitutionally  protected  space.  If a politician  designates  such  space
as a place  or channel  of communication  for  use  by the public,
notwithstanding  that  it  is  placed  on  a privately-operated  platform,  it  is
“more than sufficient to create a forum for speech”.12
8 Although the platforms have long moderated the content and their users, in many instances
they  did  so based  on unclear  and  changing  private  rules,  which  cannot  be  influenced
by the users,  and with  limited  recourse.  SMPs create  a unique type  of cyberspaces  with
continuous  monitoring of economically,  socially  and politically  relevant behavior,  which
brings  in well-recognized  identity  dilemma;  anonymity  breeds  abuses  of free speech,
cyberbullying, and trolling, yet disclosure brings profiling and privacy risks. 
9 Lazer, D. (2015) The rise of the social algorithm. Science, 348 (6239), pp. 1090–1091.  [online]
doi: 10.1126/science.aab1422 [Accessed 15 March 2019].
10 Calvert,  C.  (2018)  Federal  judge  rules  Trump’s  Twitter  account  is  a public  forum.
The Conversation, 24 May. [online] Available from: http://theconversation.com/federal-judge-
rules-trumps-twitter-account-is-a-public-forum-97159 [Accessed 15 March 2019].
11 The ruling (2nd instance decision pending) has numerous implications. First, it implies that
the existence  of myriads  of public  fora,  i.e. the walls,  feeds  and  posts  of individual
politicians  and publicly  active  persons,  who are  ascribed responsibility  for  maintaining
the integrity of these fora. The content responsibility of platforms remains limited. Second,
a question  of restricting  other  people  from  access  to the public  fora  based  on different
grounds,  such  as they  are  banned  from  SMPs  on different  grounds,  based  on private
regulation arises.  Third,  it  does  not deal  specifically  with cross-jurisdictional issues  and
related options of recourse. The decision does not represent a regulation of SMPs but rather
public figures and public bodies active on SMPs.
12 Brian C. Davison v. Loudon County Board of Supervisors et al. (2017) 1:16cv932 (JCC/IDD).
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2.1. INCREASE OF SELF-REGULATORY EFFORTS
Once  SMPs  are  understood  as media  or as public  fora,  admittedly,  they
should maintain a degree of control of what is  written thereon.  Although
for a long time SMPs were hesitant as to the regulation of users’ content, it
has  become  clear  that  some  users’  behavior  is  considered  undesirable
by the general public, or as Facebook puts it, there is “bad content” produced
by “bad actors”.13 While it may be clear in most instances what represents
a bad content and who the bad actor is, there should certainly be a wider
policy  discussion  on this,  involving  public  sector,  given  the importance
of these fora for the public discourse. As a part of the efforts to regulate bad
content, Facebook started to publish regular reports on its conduct. However,
SMPs  need  well-staffed  teams  of content  moderators –  native  speakers –
in order  to understand  local  contexts,  irony,  sarcasm,  in prevention
of harassing reports.14
The debate  over  content  moderation  also  leads  to the question
of independent review of SMPs’ decisions.  Facebook  itself proposed setting
up  of an independent  oversight  group  to review  content  moderation
appeals and adjudicate  them.15 The logic  of such  intervention,  as Facebook
claims, is to prevent the concentration of too much decision-making within
Facebook  teams  and  to achieve  platform’s  accountability,  oversight  and
assurance
”that decisions are  made in the best  interest of the online community and
not for commercial reasons.”16
The oversight group should be a platform’s analog to the US Supreme Court,
with the ability to create case law and to adapt the decision making to local
13 Facebook claims to take down more of “bad” content than ever, also proactively (Q3 2018
15,4M). Take down of fake accounts (± 750-800M/Q) – mostly used as spamming accounts
(still about 3–4 % of active users are fake accounts). Facebook Newsroom. (2018)  How Are
We Doing at Enforcing Our Community Standards?. [press release] 15 November.  Available
from: http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/11/enforcing-our-community-standards-2/
[Accessed 15 March 2019].
14 As was publicized widely, there appears to be very limited time dedication of these content
moderators as these positions seem to be highly understaffed and underpaid. See: Newton,
C. (2019) The secret lives of Facebook moderators in America. The Verge, 25 February. [online]
Available from: https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebook-content-
moderator-interviews-trauma-working-conditions-arizona [Accessed 15 March 2019].
15 Zuckerberg,  M.  (2018)  A Blueprint  for  Content  Governance  and  Enforcement.[press  release]
15 November.  Available  from:  https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-blue
print-for-content-governance-and-enforcement/10156443129621634/  [Accessed  15  March
2019].
16 Ibid.
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freedom of speech  norms  and laws.  Still  there  are  multiple  unanswered
questions regarding the oversight group.17
On top of individual abuses of platform design, SMPs have been abused
by various  more or less  organized cyber actors,  including  state and non-
-state  actors.  These  abuses  are  grave  and have a potential  of influencing
democratic  processes  by polarizing  societies,  strengthening  distrust  and
shifting  political  discourse.  Some  platforms,  such  as Facebook,  attempted
to address some of these threats. Facebook started to work with government
and law enforcement agencies (FBI,  Department of Homeland Security,  etc.),
cybersecurity researchers and other tech companies. It claims to coordinate
and  exchange  real-time  updates  on emerging  threats  and  disinformation
campaigns with agencies and think tanks.18 Also,  Facebook  launched cross-
-sectoral elections war rooms,  1st time  in September 2018, where subject-
-matter  experts  from  across  the company  gather  to address  potential
problems and respond in real time.
The bad actors  Facebook  mentions exploit the platforms’ design oriented
on pursuing  the platforms’  business  interests,  including  such  features
as tendency of sensational news and spam to spread easily (e.g. clickbaits,
viral  spam,  fake  news).  In recent  self-regulatory  action,  Facebook  started
to change  algorithms  to mitigate  the negative  effects  of these  sensational
news  and  spam.19 Similarly,  WhatsApp  changed  its  design  to limit
the number of people one can forward a message to tackle spreading of fake
and dangerous news.20 The fundamental logic of these actions is to disrupt
economic  incentives  of bad  actors  on SMPs  through  design  changes
of the service.  Facebook  claims that its algorithms will distribute needlessly
provocative  posts  less  and  less,  preventing  them  from  seeing  a spike
in engagement.  Such  action  is  mostly  related  to the so-called  borderline
17 For instance, it is unclear how the selection of members of the group would go about, how
the independence would be secured, what rules the group would follow, or how the group
would select the cases from thousands of applicants.
18 Facebook  Newsroom.  (2018)  Fighting  Election  Interference  in Real  Time.  [press  release]
18 October.  Available  from:  https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/10/war-room/  [Accessed
15 March 2019].
19 Zuckerberg,  M. (2018)  A Blueprint  for  Content  Governance and Enforcement. [press release]
15 November.  Available  from:  https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-blue
print-for-content-governance-and-enforcement/10156443129621634/  
[Accessed 15 March 2019].
20 Wagner, K. (2018) WhatsApp will drastically limit forwarding to stop the spread fake news,
following  violence  in India  and  Myanmar.  Recode, 19  July.  Available  from:
https://www.recode.net/2018/7/19/17594156/whatsapp-limit-forwarding-fake-news-
violence-india-myanmar [Accessed 15 March 2019].
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content,  which  is  not  necessarily  prohibited  by the Facebook  “Community
Rules” but are nevertheless abusive, misguiding or otherwise problematic.
Some  shortcomings  of SMPs  are  related  to information  asymmetries;
a theory goes that as people do not know who spreads certain news, they
cannot  evaluate  the trustworthiness  of the originator  of the message.  This
in turn leads to a situation when people share controversial news without
realizing  that  not  all  the news  originators  in the cyberspace  are  equally
trustworthy  or openly  claim  their  interests.  Providing  people  with  more
information  on the page owners  should  therefore  increase  the probability
that some users would double-check the trustworthiness before reposting
certain  messages.  For  instance,  Facebook  started  to provide  additional
previously  undisclosed  information  on Facebook  pages,  such  as changes
to the page  name,  in order  to assess  their  credibility,  genuineness  and
motives.21 Similarly,  Facebook  introduced  a tool  that  provided,  in some
countries, related, fact-checked sources next to disputed ones.22 Some SMPs
also  introduced  political  advertisers  verification  in order  to increase
political ads transparency, in the wake of the US Honest Ads Act.23 There is
a tendency  to strengthen the identity  verification  of influential  actors  and
accounts.24
2.2. NEED FOR OTHER TYPES OF REGULATION
All  the self-regulatory  efforts  mentioned  in the previous  section  are
laudable,  however,  we  believe  that  they  do  not  address  the problem
properly. First, many of these efforts are self-initiated. Although SMPs have
been  under  public  pressure  recently,  there  is  hardly  a legal  basis  for
Facebook  to tackle the information  asymmetry,  or for  WhatsApp  to mitigate
the spread  of fake  news.  There  is  a risk  of detriment  to the core  values
of any  SMP  in the future,  which  leaves  these  public  fora  and  public
21 Cox, J. (2018) Facebook Is Testing a Feature to Tell You If That DM Came from Russia. VICE,
10  July.  [online] Available  from:  https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ne5wgw/
facebook-testing-feature-direct-message-from-russia? [Accessed 15 March 2019].
22 Silverman, C. (2017)  Facebook Is Getting Rid Of Its Fact-Checking Label And Replacing It
With  This. BuzzFeed  News, 20 December.  [online]  Available  from:  https://www.buzzfeed
news.com/article/craigsilverman/facebook-is-getting-rid-of-its-fact-checking-label-and#.vq1
28VVB1 [Accessed 15 March 2019].
23 Zuckerberg, M. (2018) Note. [press release] 6 April.  Available from: https://www.facebook.
com/zuck/posts/10104784125525891 [Accessed 15 March 2019].
24 Stewart,  E. (2018)  Zuckerberg and Facebook are in trouble.  Here’s what the government
might do about it. Vox, 10 April. [online] Available from: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/4/10/17208322/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-congress-testimony-regulation
[Accessed 15 March 2019].
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discourse vulnerable to abuses by the platforms themselves. This brings us
to second  issue –  the platforms’  design.  Any  oversight  group  would  not
address the core problem of the platform’s design; the community will have
to adopt the standards and norms as provided by SMPs, and not originate
them.  The oversight  group  would  be  merely  an interpreter  of rules,  and
perhaps  a limited  creator  of norms,  in terms  of case  law.  Therefore,
the implementation  of oversight  group  would  have  only  limited  impact
on the core problem of the platforms’ design. 
3. COMPETITION LAW AS A PANACEA?
Although the self-regulation should not be underestimated, it follows from
the above that there should be a regulator separated from the SMPs. Self-
-regulation  may  serve  as the first  layer  of regulation,  similarly
as a supervisory  body  of a corporation  serves  as an internal  mechanism
of control. However, existence of such supervisory body does not mean that
there should not be external controllers,  such as auditors,  tax authorities,
competition  authorities,  etc.  Thus,  what  external  regulatory  mechanisms
relevant for the issues described above can we identify?
3.1. THE THREE REGULATORY MECHANISMS
From  among  the prospective  regulatory  mechanisms  we  discuss  three
applicable  mechanisms  on SMPs,  all  targeting  various  aspects
of the platforms.25 The first  one  is  the regulation  through  personal  data
protection. SMPs own considerable amount of data whereas much of it may
fall  within  the definition  of personal  data  pursuant  to Article 4(1)
of GDPR.26 Given the large applicability of GDPR, possibility to impose high
fines  and  pan-European  character  of the regulation,  GDPR  is  of vital
importance for regulation of SMPs. However, GDPR is of no use if a consent
of data  subjects  is  given27,  or if data  processed  by SMPs  are  no  longer
personal data. The latter is often the case when big data are at stake, i.e.
25 See, for instance:  Kerber, W. (2016) Digital  markets, data, and privacy:  competition law,
consumer  law and data  protection.  Journal  of Intellectual  Property  Law & Practice,  11 (11),
pp. 856–866; Botta, M. and Wiedemann, K. (2018) EU Competition Law Enforcement vis-à-
-vis Exploitative Conducts in the Data Economy Exploring the Terra Incognita. Max Planck
Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper,  18-08, p. 23  et seq. [online] Available
from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3184119 [Accessed 4 March 2019].
26 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the protection  of natural  persons  with  regard  to the processing  of personal  data  and
on the free  movement  of such  data,  and  repealing  Directive  95/46/EC  (General  Data
Protection Regulation). Official Journal of the European Union (2016/L-119/1) 4 May.
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“the collection  and  processing  of large  quantities  of data  through
sophisticated methods (e.g. advanced processing through algorithms).”28
The second  regulatory  mechanism  is  related  to consumer  protection,
which  is  part  of legal  orders  of all  EU  Member  States.  Consumers  are
defined as persons who do not act within their professional capacity, hence
are  more  vulnerable  in contractual  relations.  Their  lack  of professional
knowledge  is  compensated  by cogent  legal  norms  which  impose  duties
on businesses  as the other  parties  of contractual  relationships.29 One
of the aims of these cogent legal norms is to protect consumers from unfair
contractual terms. In certain areas of law, protection from unfair contractual
terms  is  given  to non-consumers  as well.30 Although  these  special  areas
of law  are  rarely  applicable  to the SMPs,  consumer  protection  law  falls
within  the scope  of our  analysis,  since  users  of SMPs  are,  as a rule,
consumers.  If a contractual  term  causes  a severe  inequity  between
a consumer  and  a business  to the detriment  of a consumer,  such  unfair
contractual  term  may  be  invalid  even  though  the consumer  has  agreed
to it.31 Therefore,  such  unfair  terms  may  cover  undisclosed  harvesting
of consumer's  data,  vague  use  of data,  non-user-friendly  terms  and
conditions.32 Although part of these issues may be solved by personal data
protection law, consumer protection may go, at least in theory, further, as it
is  not  limited  to acquiring  and  handling  of personal  data.  However,
27 Article 7 GDPR. To the notion of consent, see, for example: Botta, M. and Wiedemann, K.
(2018)  EU  Competition  Law  Enforcement  vis-vis-à-visà-vis  Exploitative  Conducts
in the Data Economy Exploring the Terra Incognita.  Max Planck Institute for Innovation and
Competition  Research  Paper.  18-08,  p. 23  et  seq.  [online]  Available  from:  https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3184119 [Accessed 4 March 2019]; Hintze, M. (2018) Viewing the GDPR through
a De-Identification  Lens:  A Tool  for  Compliance,  Clarification,  and  Consistency.
International Data Protection Law, 8 (1), pp. 86–101.
28 Davilla, M. (2017) Is Big Data a Different Kind of Animal? The Treatment of Big Data Under
the EU Competition Rules.  Journal of European Competition Law & Practice,  8 (6), p. 370. For
another  definition  of big  data,  see:  Stucke,  M.  E.  and  Alan,  G.  P.  (2016)  Big  Data  and
Competition Policy. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 15 et seq.
29 This  follows,  for  instance,  from  Recitals  17,  34,  39  etc.  of Directive  2011/83/EU
of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 25  October  2011  on consumer  rights,
amending  Council  Directive  93/13/EEC  and  Directive  1999/44/EC  of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. Official Journal of the European Union
(2011/L-304/64) 22 November.
30 See,  for  instance,  sections  369a  et  seq.  of Commercial  Code:  Obchodný  zákonník  2019.
SI 1991/513. Slovak Republic. In Slovak; Act on Unfair Conditions in Commercial Relations
with Food as the Object:  Zákon o neprimeraných podmienkach v obchodných vzťahoch,  ktorých
predmetom sú potraviny 2013. SI 2012/369. Slovak Republic. In Slovak.
31 Section 53 of Civil Code: Občiansky zákonník 2019. SI 1964/40. Slovak Republic. In Slovak.
32 Kerber, W. (2016) Digital markets, data, and privacy: competition law, consumer law and
data protection. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 11 (11), pp. 861–863.
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the enforcement  mechanism  of consumer  law  seems  to be  weaker  than
the enforcement of GDPR.33
The last regulatory mechanism which is lively discussed among scholars
is  competition law. Together  with  ex ante  control  of mergers,  which may
prevent  creation of too strong undertakings,  competition  law may tackle
abuses of dominant position as well as agreements restricting competition.
The supranational  enforcement  mechanism  and  the detergence  effect
of substantial fines which may be imposed by competition authorities make
scholars  wonder  whether  this  might  be  the most  suitable  regulatory
mechanisms  for  SMPs.  We  will  discuss  the adequacy  of such  thoughts
in more detail.
3.2. ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION OF SMPS
In general,  legal  theory  distinguishes  between  exclusionary  abusive
practices and exploitative abusive practices. The former aims to preventing
the development  of competition  by a dominant  undertaking,  the latter  is
mainly  concerned  with  charging  of unfair  prices  by a dominant
undertaking.34
Regarding exclusionary practices, it is questionable whether the position
of certain SMPs, mainly  Facebook,  qua persons with access to great amount
of data, puts them in position of owners of an essential facility.35 If this was
the case, competitors of Facebook could ask Facebook to give access to its data
by arguing  that  otherwise  they  would  be  excluded  from  competition.
However, this would hardly work in practice.36 Moreover, it  would mean
that  even more  persons  would  have  access  to data  and  could  use  them
in similar  manner as Facebook  can.  In other  words,  even if the competition
33 To this end, see, for instance, Patakyová, M. and Mazúr, J. (2018) Facebook – Global Issue
without (Existing)  Solution? In:  Tomas Kliestik  (ed.).  Globalization and Its  Socio-Economic
Consequences  18th  International  Scientific  Conference,  Proceedings,  (Part  V. –  Digital  Single
Market). Rajecké Teplice, 10–11 October. Žilina: University of Žilina. 
34 Whish, R. and Bailey,  D. (2012)  Competition Law.  7th ed. Oxford University Press, p. 201;
Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. (2016) EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials. 6th ed. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, p. 352.
35 Botta,  M.  and  Wiedemann,  K.  (2018)  EU  Competition  Law  Enforcement  vis-à-vis
Exploitative Conducts in the Data Economy Exploring the Terra Incognita. SSRN Electronic
Journal, p. 46 et seq. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3184119 [Accessed 15 March 2019].
36 Davilla, M. (2017) Is Big Data a Different Kind of Animal? The Treatment of Big Data Under
the EU  Competition  Rules.  Journal  of European  Competition  Law  & Practice, 8 (6),  p. 380.
[online] doi: 10.1093/jeclap/lpx039 [Accessed 15 March 2019]; Colangelo, G. and Maggiolino,
M.  (2018)  Data  Accumulation  and  the Privacy-Antitrust  Interface:  Insights  from
the Facebook  Case  for  the EU  and  the U.S.  SSRN  Electronic  Journal, p. 43.  [online]
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3125490.  Available  from:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125490  [Accessed
2 March 2019].
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was better off, the privacy concerns would be aggravated.37 This is certainly
not what a regulation should stand for. Arguably, the regulation should aim
to control the power currently possessed by certain SMPs, namely Facebook,
as opposite  to spreading  the power  to virtually  all  SMPs.  Therefore,
exploitative practices seem to be better suited for issues related to SMPs.
At the very beginning of any discussion related to exploitative practices
it is worth mentioning that competition authorities usually put their hands
off this  type of abuse,  and they have good reasons to do so. Exploitative
practices  are related to excessive  prices  for  products/services.  The idea is
that,  since an undertaking holds dominant  position,  it  may charge unfair
prices for its customers (consumers) and, therefore, exploit them. It is often
very  difficult  to establish  the level  above  which  the price  for  a product/
service  is  excessive,  especially  when cost-based analysis  cannot  be  used.
This is the case for many intellectual property rights, such as copyrights.38
In terms of SMPs, the situation with price for their services is even more
complex.  On the one  hand,  SMPs  provide  space  for  advertisement.
Advertisers  pay  for  this  service  by money.  On the other  hand,  SMPs
provide  social  networking  services  to their  users.  In this  case,  users  pay
by their  attention  and  data.39 On the latter  market,  the idea  of abuse  lies
in SMPs  selling their  social  networking  services  for  too  high  price,
i.e. harvesting of too much data40 or based on unclear  terms or processing
them for wrong purposes. However, how can one establish that the price
charged for social networking services is too high?
3.3. GERMAN FACEBOOK CASE
In March  2016,  the German  competition  authority,  Bundeskartellamt,
initiated  proceedings  against  Facebook  for  potential  breach  of German
37 Kerber, W. (2016) Digital Markets, Data, and Privacy: Competition Law, Consumer Law,
and  Data  Protection.  SSRN  Electronic  Journal,  p. 861.  [online] doi:  10.2139/ssrn.2770479
[Accessed 15 March 2019].
38 See for instance: Patakyová, M. (2018) How to Assess the Exploitative Practices of Collecting
Societies?  European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, 1 (4), pp. 306–319.  [online] doi:
10.21552/core/2017/4/6 [Accessed 15 March 2019].
39 Kerber, W. (2016) Digital Markets, Data, and Privacy: Competition Law, Consumer Law,
and  Data  Protection.  SSRN  Electronic  Journal,  p. 860.  [online] doi:  10.2139/ssrn.2770479
[Accessed  15 March  2019];  Newman,  J.  M.  (2015)  Antitrust  in Zero-Price  Markets:
Foundations. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 164 (1), pp. 149–206; Langhanke, C. and
Schmidt-Kessel, M. (2015) Consumer Data as Consideration. Journal of European Consumer
and Market Law, 4 (6), pp. 218–223.
40 Colangelo,  G.  and  Maggiolino,  M.  (2018)  Data  Accumulation  and  the Privacy-Antitrust
Interface: Insights from the Facebook case for the EU and the U.S.  SSRN Electronic Journal,
p. 21. [online] Available from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125490 [Accessed 2 March 2019].
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competition  rules.41 It  was  clear  that  Bundeskartellamt  would  connect
infringement  of data  protection  law  with  abuse  of dominant  position
of Facebook,  however, it  was not clear how the authority would like to do
that. This puzzle was solved recently, as in February 2019, Bundeskartellamt
issued  decision  by which  it  prohibited  Facebook  from  continuing  its
practice.42 It was held that
“[t]he  extent  to which  Facebook  collects,  merges  and  uses  data  in user
accounts constitutes an abuse of a dominant position.”43
It  was  of crucial  importance  how  Bundeskartellamt  would  define
the relevant market. Eventually, the product market for social networks was
chosen as the relevant one.44 Facebook  is thus considered to hold dominant
position on this market, as
“[s]ervices  like  Snapchat,  YouTube  or Twitter,  but  also  professional
networks like LinkedIn and Xing only offer parts of the services of a social
network and are thus not to be included in the relevant market. However,
even  if these  services  were  included  in the relevant  market,  the Facebook
group with its subsidiaries Instagram and WhatsApp would still  achieve
very  high  market  shares  that  would  very  likely  be  indicative
of a monopolization process.”45
Therefore,  apart  from  smaller  German  social  networks,  Facebook  is
essentially the only genuine social network, after  Google+  has disappeared
from  the market.  Facebook  holds  market  share  of more  than  90 %.46
Moreover,  the market  power  of Facebook  is  supported  by the access
41 Bundeskartellamt.  (2016)  Bundeskartellamt  initiates  proceeding  against  Facebook  on suspicion
of having abused its market power by infringing data protection rules.  [press release] 2 March.
Available  from:  https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Press
emitteilungen/2016/02_03_2016_Facebook.html [Accessed 9 March 2019].
42 Bundeskartellamt.  (2019)  Bundeskartellamt prohibits  Facebook  from combining  user  data  from
different  sources.  Background information on the Bundeskartellamt’s  Facebook  proceeding.  [press
release]  2  March.  Available  from:  https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/
Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_2019_Facebook_FAQs.pdf__blob=
publicationFile&v=5 [Accessed 9 March 2019].
43 Ibid.
44 It flows from the Background information on the Bundeskartellamt’s Facebook proceeding that
Bundeskartellamt  conducted  a substantial  qualitative  analysis,  as it  compared  the type
of service Facebook provides with other, similar, yet not identical services, such as YouTube. 
45 Bundeskartellamt. (2019) Op. cit.
46 Bundeskartellamt. (2019) Op. cit.
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to competitive  relevant  data  or network  effects.47 The latter  leads  to high
barriers  to entry.  Although  virtually  everyone  can  enter  the market
by creating their own social network, such new network will be of little use
as far  as there  is  not  enough  people  to network together.  The dominant
position of Facebook  was not threatened by possibility to simultaneous use
of several different social networks (multi-homing), which was not proved
according to the Bundeskartellamt.48
After  establishment  of the dominant  position  on the relevant  market,
Bundeskartellamt  focused  on the abusive  practice  Facebook  committed.
Facebook’s  lucrative  advertising  model  relies  on data  collected  not  only
on Facebook,  but  also  by the use  of third-party  websites  and  apps
via Facebook’s embedded tools.49 Such off-Facebook data collection50 is usually
not  predicted by Facebook  users.51 As off-Facebook  data are combined with
on-Facebook  data,  they  may  be  used  for  creating  very  extended  profiles
of users.  It  is  true  that  users  technically  agree  with  such  conditions,
however,  as there  is  no  other  option  for  them but  to agree  on terms set
by Facebook  (if they  want  to use  Facebook  at all),  such  consent  cannot  be
considered  as deliberately  given.  Taken  together  with  Facebook  market
power,  users  have  little  to no  choice.  Pursuant  to Bundeskartellamt,  such
practice  is  also  a violation  of personal  data  regulation  and  right
to informational self-determination.52
In order to remedy this situation, the German competition authority did
not impose any fine on Facebook. Rather, it said that its goal was to change
the future  behavior  of Facebook  to the benefit  of both  competitors  and
consumers.  Bundeskartellamt  considered  the case  to be  too  complex  and
47 Haucap,  J.  and Heimeshoff,  U.  (2013)  Google,  Facebook,  Amazon,  eBay:  Is  the internet
driving competition or market monopolization?  DICE Discussion Paper, (83)  p. 3.  [online]
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68229 [Accessed 9 March 2019]; Tucker, C. and
Marthews, A. (2012) Social Networks, Advertising, and Antitrust. George Mason Law Review,
19 (5), p. 1217 et seq.
48 Bundeskartellamt. (2019) Op. cit.
49 Ibid.
50 A similar  situation was dealt  by the CJEU: Judgment of 29 July 2019,  Fashion ID GmbH
& Co.KG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV, C-40/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:629.
51 Botta,  M.  and  Wiedemann,  K.  (2018)  EU  Competition  Law  Enforcement  vis-à-vis
Exploitative  Conducts  in the Data  Economy  Exploring  the Terra  Incognita.  Max  Planck
Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper, 18-08, p. 64.  [online] Available from:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3184119 [Accessed 4 March 2019].
52 From  the competition  law  perspective,  the theory  of harm  for  consumers  was  based
on Facebook users’ loss of control over how their personal data are used. Bundeskartellamt.
(2019) Op. cit.
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difficult from legal and economic perspective, therefore, at this stage, fine
as an additional measure was not imposed.53
3.4. HAS AN EFFECTIVE REGULATORY MECHANISM BEEN 
ESTABLISHED?
The German  Facebook  case is  fresh.  As Facebook  indicated  its  intention
to appeal against the decision54, we cannot be sure whether the decision will
be overruled or not.  Nonetheless,  if we assumed that the Bundeskartellamt
decision was upheld, would it mean that we have an effective mechanism
for  regulation  of the SMPs?  We  remain  skeptical  as to the effects  of such
decision.
First, one should not overlook the particularities of German competition
law. Even though national competition laws of the Member States converge
to competition  law  of the EU,  they  are  not  the same.  Particularly,  since
prosecution  of abuse  of dominant  position  is  prosecution  of a unilateral
conduct,  national  competition  law  can  go  further  than  European
competition law.55 The German legislator detailed the methods of assessing
market  power  in such  manner  that  access  to data  should  be  taken  into
consideration. Therefore, the German legislation is better suited for putting
together  an infringement  of personal  data  regulation  with  a breach
of competition regulation than the EU legislation.
Second, apart from the wording of legal rules, it is vital to bear in mind
that  supra-competition  interpretation  of competition  rules  is  on different
level  in Germany.  It  is  explicitly  recognized  by Bundeskartellamt  that
the highest  German  court  has  ruled  that  constitutional  or other  legal
principles may be considered in abuse of dominant position cases.56 When
we zoom in on case law of the EU institutions, it is apparent that they have
been rather reluctant to broaden competition law analysis by personal data
considerations.57
53 Ibid.
54 Dreyfuss,  E.  (2019)  German  Regulators  Just  Outlawed  Facebook's  Whole  Ad  Business.
Wired, 7  February.  [online] Available  from:  https://www.wired.com/story/germany-
facebook-antitrust-ruling/ [Accessed 16 February 2019].
55 See  Article  3  para  2  of Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 1/2003  of 16  December  2002
on the implementation  of the rules  on competition  laid  down  in Articles  81  and  82
of the Treaty.
56 Bundeskartellamt. (2019) Op. cit.
57 Judgment  of 23  November  2006,  Asnef-Equifax,  Servicios  de Información  sobre  Solvencia
y Crédito, SL v Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc),  C-235/05, ECLI:EU:C:
2006:734, para 63.
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Third, even if infringement of data regulation could support competition
law  case  in a similar  manner  as in Germany,  it  is  doubtful  whether
competition law may be considered as the effective regulation for SMPs. For
instance, GDPR does not have to be violated in each case. If Facebook  users
gave effective consent to harvesting off-Facebook  data, would it  mean that
there was no infringement of competition law? If so, this does not reflect
the so-called  privacy  paradox,  i.e. the fact  that  people  care  about  their
privacy, but do not act accordingly.58 Due to very strong network effects,
there  are  no  real  alternatives  to specific  platforms  for  a huge  majority
of users;  the network  effects  imply  high  costs  of opt-outs,  which  makes
them impractical.59 Furthermore, there is no product and service life-cycle
or amortization,  as the platform  services  are  continuous  with  ongoing
upgrades (SaaS). There are also very high entry barriers for any would-be
competitors.  Finally,  the competitive  advantage makes  it  easier  for  these
resource-rich  platforms  to acquire  competition  or merge  their  products
or features  into  their  own  products  and  services.60 Therefore,  if Facebook
collects  off-Facebook  data  based  on a genuine  consent  only,  it  may  easily
happen that users will give their consent and that Facebook will have access
to similar amount of data it has nowadays.
Fourth,  Bundeskartellamt’s  decision  is  related  to a highly  specific
situation.  After  Facebook  put  its  data  processing  practices  in line  with
German law, there will be no more ground for holding  Facebook  conducts
accountable.  However,  as it  was  described  in the first  part  of this  article,
issues related to Facebook are far more reaching. 
Fifth,  competition  law  is  definitely  not  an effective  regulatory
mechanism when it comes to the speed of its procedure. Due to the plethora
of economic and legal issues which need to be solved before a decision is
issued, the investigation often takes months, even years.61 In the meantime,
damage  caused  to users  or even  to civil  society  may  be  significant  and
unrepairable.62
58 Op. cit., p. 26.
59 Farrell, J. and Klemperer, P. (2006) Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching
Costs  and  Network  Effects.  SSRN  Electronic  Journal. [online]  doi:  10.2139/ssrn.917785
[Accessed 15 March 2019].
60 For example, see the Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram or WhatsApp.
61 Let  us  remind that  the investigation  of Facebook  in Germany started in March  2016  with
decision rendered in February 2019.
62 Let us assume that elections are at least partially influenced by Facebook. Therefore, if off-
-Facebook data collection and creation of users’ profiles influenced elections, competition law
would come too late to remedy the course of election. 
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Sixth,  what  should  be  the proper  remedy  once  infringement
of competition  law is  recognized?  In the German  Facebook  case,  behavioral
remedies  were  imposed  by Bundeskartellamt.63 However,  is  such  remedy
genuinely effective? Who would be able to review whether off-Facebook data
collection was truly stopped and that there was no technical or legal loop-
-hole which would allow its continuing? Last but not least, it seems that
competition law is somehow forced to serve purposes it was not originally
designed  for.  Although  primary  objectives  of the competition  law  vary
among  states,64 it  is  overall  related  to the protection  of competition
to the benefit of consumers. The position of SMPs, as well as all data giants,
goes further than to potential deformation of (economic) competition.
4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
While  platforms prefer to be understood as technology companies,  rather
than media companies, thus limiting their responsibility over users’ content
and behavior, they certainly mediate messages and information and clearly
hold  some  responsibility  for  the intermediation  channels  they  operate.
Accountability  in private  or market  sphere  is often  understood
on a transactional  basis;  one could simply  switch  the service  if one is  not
satisfied with the quality of product or service, the price or their ratio.65 But
the problem  with  accountability  of SMPs  does  not  lie  in poor  quality
product  or service,  but rather in (i) negative externalities  on communities,
such  as through  election  influencing,  or facilitation  of fake  news
proliferation, i.e. the service design problem; and (ii) the fact that users may
not realize they may be paying too huge a price for the service, in provided
personal  data  or attention,  i.e. the price  problem,  as highlighted  also
by the recent German Facebook case. 
63 To the notion of behavioural remedies, see, for instance: Kalesná, K. and Patakyová, M. T.
(2018)  Behavioral  vs. Structural  Remedies  in European  and  Slovak  Competition  Law.
In: Humberto Ribeiro, Dora Naletina and Ana Lorga da Silva (eds.).  Economic and Social
Development:  35th  International  Scientific  Conference  on Economic  and  Social  Development –
"Sustainability from an Economic and Social Perspective", Lisbon, Portugal, 15–16 November.
Croatia: Varazdin Development and Entrepreneurship Agency, pp. 518–526.
64 Blažo,  O.  (2017)  Účel  zákona  o ochrane  hospodárskej  súťaže  ako  právno-ekonomické
interpretačné  pravidlo.  In:  Mária  Patakyová  (ed.).  Efektívnosť  právnej  úpravy  ochrany
hospodárskej  súťaže – návrhy de lege ferenda.  Bratislava,  Slovakia,  25 September.  Bratislava:
Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave, Právnická fakulta, pp. 5–11.
65 Bovens,  M.,  Schillemans,  T.  and  Goodin,  R.  E.  (2014)  Public  Accountability.  In:  Mark
Bovens,  Robert  E.  Goodin and Thomas Schillemans (eds.).  The Oxford Handbook  of Public
Accountability. Online edition. Oxford University Press.
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Public  accountability  thus  becomes  more relevant  and we  argue  that
currently  there  is  a lack  of accountability  of SMPs.  Public  accountability
implies  proper  checks  and  balances  and  democratic  control  of power.66
Accountability requires answerability (holding one to account),  subjection
to accountability, agent and principal  and the right to require information
or justification  and  a right  to sanction  if the principal  fails.67 In terms
of the first  identified  problem,  i.e. the service  design  problem,  only  very
limited public accountability may be exerted on platforms, although recent
public  hearing  of Facebook’s  CEO and main  shareholder  Mark  Zuckerberg
by US  Congress  shows  the validity  and  necessity  of such  actions.68
A regulatory  regime  needs  to take  into  account  all  of the elements
of accountability,  not  merely  an ad  hoc  public  inquiry  by the legislative
branch.  As for  the second  problem,  we  see  how  limited  the competition
authorities  can be in addressing  the issue fully  and in relation to the first
issue. 
Arguably,  in case  of SMPs the accountability  regimes  are not  properly
set as there is not a clear legal cause of holding platforms accountable for
providing infrastructure (inadvertently) tailored to abusive behavior. In this
regard,  we  analyzed  the SMPs’  self-regulatory  efforts  and three  external
regulatory regimes: data protection, consumer protection and competition
law.  Remedying  through data  protection  and competition  law,  although
the most  promising,  does  not  fulfil  the requirements  for  effective  and
proper regulation of SMPs.  This  was proved by the German Facebook  case.
The key problem with the regulation of SMPs appears to lie in the fact that
none  of the regulatory  regimes  is  able  to change  the SMP’s  design.
The platforms’ design is a crucial determinant of the options or rights users
are granted, channels they use to disseminate various information, or what
content is permitted or curated by the platforms.69 In this sense, the code is
the platforms’  law,  as Lessig  put  it.70 Although  certain  platforms  claim
66 Han,  Y.  and  Demircioglu,  M.  A.  (2016)  Accountability,  Politics,  and  Power.  Global
Encyclopedia  of Public  Administration,  Public  Policy,  and  Governance, pp. 1–8.  [online]
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_2453-1 [Accessed 15 March 2019].
67 Murphy, P. et al. (2019)  Public service accountability: rekindling a debate.  Cham, Switzerland:
Palgrave Macmillan, p. 7.
68 At the same  time,  it  showed  how  limited  such  action  was;  many  of the inquirers  from
among representatives possessed limited knowledge of how the platform actually operated
or even the gravity of the situation.
69 Lazer, D. (2015) The rise of the social algorithm. Science, 348 (6239), pp. 1090–1091.  [online]
doi: 10.1126/science.aab1422 [Accessed 15 March 2019].
70 Lessig, L. (2006) Code and other laws of cyberspace: version 2.0. New York: Basic Books.
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to seek  also  complementary  objectives  (”Building  a global  community” –
Facebook)71,  the platforms’  design  is  fundamentally  driven  by the market-
-oriented  ambitions.  Yet,  if we  recognize  the importance  of SMPs
in contemporary society72, we may reach a conclusion that platforms’ design
not only makes the processes more difficult, it may in fact contradict them. 
 As Lazer  et al.  proposed,  we  need  to ask  how  we  can  build  a news
ecosystem and culture that value and promote truth.73 In doing so we need
to review platforms’ inner regulations, i.e. the code, algorithms, information
filters74 and other  in-built  design  features  that  regulate  how information
flows in the platform cyberspace.  It  is  necessary  to independently  review
biases  of algorithms75,  consistency  of the content  regulation  in individual
cases,  but  also  improve  the information  asymmetries  the users  face  and
safeguard the integrity of political  competition.  The oversight  needs to be
publicly  appointed,  independent  on the platform  and  accountable
to the formal  democratic  structures.76 Such  actions  are  warranted
by the sheer importance of the platforms for our democracies.
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